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How To Motivate Anti-Luck Virtue
Epistemology
Christoph Kelp∗
Abstract
Duncan Pritchard has recently defended an account of knowl-
edge that combines a safety condition with an ability condition
on knowledge. In order to explain this bipartite structure of
knowledge he appeals to Edward Craig’s work on the concept
of knowledge. This paper argues that Pritchard’s envisaged ex-
planation fails and offers a better alternative.
1 Introduction
In a number of recent pieces Duncan Pritchard [e.g. 2010, 2012] has
defended a view he calls anti-luck virtue epistemology (ALVE). Ac-
cording to ALVE,
S knows that p if and only if S’s safe true belief that p is the
product of her relevant cognitive abilities (such that her safe
cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to her cog-
nitive agency).
[Pritchard 2012: 273]
While there are a number of subtleties in Pritchard’s version of ALVE,
what’s most important for present purposes is that the view counte-
nances two independent epistemic conditions on knowledge, to wit,
a safety-from-error condition and a truth-from-ability condition. In
other words, according to ALVE, knowledge has bipartite epistemic
structure.
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The question that sets the agenda for this paper (henceforth also
“the crucial question”) is why knowledge has the bipartite structure
ALVE claims it has.1
In the following passage Pritchard also asks this question and
immediately goes on divide it into two subquestions:
One question that we might ask about anti-luck virtue episte-
mology is why knowledge has this two-part structure in the
first place. Put another way, why do we have these two master
intuitions about knowledge [subquestion 1], and have them in
such a fashion that they make distinct demands on our theory
of knowledge [subquestion 2]?
[Pritchard 2012: 274]
In order to see why Pritchard thinks that the crucial question can
be broken down into these two subquestions, it is important to realise
that Pritchard takes ALVE ultimately to be motivated by what he
refers to as “two master intuitions about knowledge”. The first “anti-
luck” intuition has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck in the
sense that if one knows a proposition, p, then it cannot be the case
that one’s underlying belief that p is merely luckily true. In contrast,
according to the second “ability” intuition, knowledge requires that
one hit the mark of truth thanks to intellectual ability. In other words,
if one knows a proposition, p, then that one believes the truth about
p must result from the exercise of an intellectual ability [2012: 247-8].
Given that this is how ALVE’s bipartite structure is to be motivated, it
is not hard to see that the question why knowledge should have this
1 One might worry that, ever since Gettier’s famous 1963 paper, there is excellent
reason for thinking that knowledge is requires a further epistemic condition besides
justification. By the same token, there is excellent reason to think knowledge has
bipartite epistemic structure and, as a result, Pritchard’s attempt at answering the
crucial question is simply superfluous. I would like to make two points by way of
response: First, the bipartite structure of knowledge ALVE postulates does not map
onto the distinction between the justification condition on the one hand and the
condition that deals with Gettier cases on the other. Rather, Pritchard thinks that
ALVE’s two conditions both take on anti-Gettier duties: while some Gettier cases
are handled by ALVE’s ability condition, others are handled by the safety condition
(as becomes clear in Pritchard’s discussion of the Temp and Barney cases [2012:
260-1, 267-9]). Thus, even if Gettier cases serve to motivate a kind of bipartitism, it
is not the one that Pritchard needs. Second, Pritchard’s concern with this question
appears to be motivated at least in part by a worry, raised for instance by John
Greco [2010b: 227], that an account of knowledge that is motivated only by its
ability to handle various cases is ad hoc in a problematic way. It is not hard to see
that in order to address this worry Pritchard needs a motivation that is entirely
different than the one Gettier’s argument could supply.
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structure should boil down to the questions of why we have these
two master intuitions and why we have them in such a way that they
make distinct demands on our theory of knowledge.
It may be worth noting just why it matters that Pritchard can offer
a good answer to the crucial question and especially to subquestion
2. First, success from ability very plausibly contrasts with lucky suc-
cess. By way of illustration, consider a competent archer, A, who fires
a shot at a target. Suppose that, unbeknownst to A, (i) strong winds
are blowing around the target and (ii) A is fortunate enough to have
a helper with a wind machine who ensures that his shot will hit the
target anyway. In this case, A’s hitting the target is lucky for A rather
than the result of his ability. Lucky success contrasts with success
from ability here. Given, additionally, that this point generalises and
that, in the case of knowledge, the relevant kind of success is true
belief, we get the result that believing the truth from ability contrasts
with believing the truth as a matter of luck. It may now appear that
the anti-luck intuition can be derived from the ability intuition and
that, in consequence, the two intuitions do not impose independent
demands on knowledge.2 Even if we are willing to grant that we have
the two master intuitions, their mere existence is thus not sufficient
to motivate ALVE in the way envisaged by Pritchard. In addition,
Pritchard needs some account of why we have the two intuitions in
such a way that they make distinct demands on our theory of knowl-
edge. In other words, he needs an answer to the crucial question.
This paper discusses how, if at all, the crucial question can be
answered. More specifically, I will outline Pritchard’s own proposal
(section 2), show that it remains unsatisfactory (section 3), and pro-
vide an alternative that will do the job for Pritchard (section 4). As
I see it, then, the ultimate aim of this paper is to lend Pritchard a
helping hand.
2 Pritchard [2012: 248-9]. This is a line often pursued by virtue epistemologists
such as Greco [2010a, 2012], Wayne Riggs [2002, 2009] and Ernest Sosa [2007, 2011].
It may also be worth noting that Pritchard does not mean to deny that the ability
intuition entails the absence of a certain type of luck (sometimes referred to by
Pritchard as ‘intervening luck’ [e.g. 2008]). On the contrary, Pritchard embraces
this result (see also §2.2 below). However, he contends that, in addition, knowledge
entails the absence of yet another kind of luck (‘environmental luck’). It is this
requirement that is captured only by the anti-luck intuition.
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2 Pritchard’s proposal
In order to answer the crucial question, Pritchard draws on Edward
Craig’s [1990] work on the function of the concept of knowledge.3
(I will henceforth also use ‘. . . ’ in smallcaps as a shorthand for ‘the
concept of . . . ’. Thus, for instance, ‘knowledge’ means ‘the concept
of knowledge’.) In order to be able to assess Pritchard’s answer, it
will be necessary to take a brief look at Craig’s relevant work.
2.1 Craig’s genealogical account of the concept of knowledge
Craig’s core thesis is that the function of knowledge is to flag good
informants. In support of this thesis, he first imagines a linguistic
community, L, which resembles our present linguistic community in
that its members need true beliefs about its environment and can get
them via testimony from other members. At the same time, L also
differs from us in that it does not possess knowledge. Craig observes
that L would need a concept to flag good informants and goes on to
offer a detailed account of what this concept would have looked like
(Stage 1, I will henceforth also refer to the concept at this stage as
‘the concept of protoknowledge’) and how further needs could have
caused it to evolve into the concept of knowledge we are familiar
with today (Stage 2).
Concerning Stage 1, Craig argues that we can get at the appli-
cation conditions of protoknowledge by considering what general
properties an inquirer of L, who does not yet have a belief on the
question at hand, would want a prospective informant to have. By
way of illustration, suppose Elmo and Zoe are members of L and
Elmo does not yet have a belief on whether the paintings they are
looking at are Gonzos but wants to get one from Zoe. We can get
at the application conditions of protoknowledge whether the paint-
3 I’d like to flag a couple of issues I will not discuss within the scope of this pa-
per, viz. (a) questions concerning Craig’s methodology and (b) whether the crucial
question is best answered by appeal to a thesis about the function of the concept of
knowledge. For the purposes of this paper, this should not be a cause for concern.
Regarding (a), notice that Pritchard also helps himself to Craig’s work without fur-
ther ado. Since the aim of the paper is to lend Pritchard a helping hand, I can leave
it to Pritchard to remedy any defect that should arise from so doing. Regarding
(b), notice that in order to get his the sought after motivation for ALVE, what mat-
ters to Pritchard is that there be some answer to the crucial question. As a result,
the question whether Pritchard has identified the best answer is not immediately
pressing for Pritchard. Should it turn out that there is a better, entirely different
way of achieving this, Pritchard can happily accept it.
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ings are Gonzos by asking ourselves what general properties Elmo
would want Zoe to have. More specifically Craig suggests that the
inquirer (Elmo) would want the informant (Zoe) to tell her the truth
on the question (i); he would want her to be as likely to tell the truth
on question as his concerns require (ii); he would want her to be
detectable as sufficiently likely to tell the truth (iii); he would want
the channels of communication between them to be open (iv); and he
would want her to be accessible here and now (v) [1990: 85]. Accord-
ing to Craig, then, protoknowledge features a truth condition (i),
a reliability condition that is relative to inquirer concerns (ii), and a
number of indicator conditions (iii – v) that are also inquirer-relative
in various ways.
Concerning Stage 2, Craig argues that, where L has attained a
sufficient degree of cognitive sophistication, it will be extremely use-
ful for members of L to have a concept that enables its members to
recommend informants on certain questions to others, even when the
recommender does not himself know the answer to the question or
the needs of the recommendee. Suppose Elmo, Zoe and Oscar are
members of L. Suppose Elmo does not have a belief on whether the
paintings exhibited are Gonzos and has asked Oscar. Oscar himself
does not know the answer to Elmo’s question and does not know
why Elmo asked, but he wants to recommend Zoe as an informant.
In this situation, it may be useful for L to have a concept of good
informant that Oscar can properly apply to Zoe. As Craig argues,
since protoknowledge is inquirer-relative in a number of ways, it is
unsuitable for this purpose. In our toy case, Zoe may not satisfy the
indicator conditions relative to Elmo. Moreover, since it is not known
to Oscar (the recommender) what exactly Elmo’s concerns require, it
is not clear to Oscar that Zoe meets the reliability condition relative
to these concerns. What is needed instead is an objective, inquirer-
neutral concept of good informant. In response to this need, proto-
knowledge evolves into exactly such an objective, inquirer-neutral
concept (a process Craig’s refers to as ‘objectivisation’).
Exactly how does protoknowledge evolve here? Craig argues
that objectivisation will relax the indicator conditions. This is to al-
low the concept to be properly applicable to Zoe, even when she does
not meet these conditions relative to Elmo. At the same time, objec-
tivisation will tighten the reliability condition. Given that the concept
is to be applicable even when the concerns of the inquirer are not
known, claims Craig, one had better prepare for the worst. Count-
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ing only informants that are reliable enough to suit anyone’s needs
ensures this. Oscar will be able to recommend Zoe as an informant
to Elmo without further qualms, even when he doesn’t know how
demanding Elmo’s concerns are. The concept objectivisation outputs
(relaxed indicator conditions, stringent, interest-invariable reliability
condition) resembles our present concept of knowledge sufficiently
closely to confirm Craig’s initial hypothesis [1990: 86-91].
2.2 Pritchard’s answer to the crucial question
Let’s move on to Pritchard’s answer to the crucial question. Pritchard
invites us to imagine that we are have completed Stage 1 of Craig’s
project and are now at Stage 2. He states his first central idea in the
following passage:
[T]here is an important ambiguity in the very notion of a re-
liable (and hence good) informant. In one sense, it means an
informant who possesses a reliable cognitive ability with re-
gard to the target subject matter (and who is willing to sincerely
communicate what she believes, something that we will take for
granted in what follows). In another sense, it means an infor-
mant whom one can rely on (that is, whose information will not
lead you astray).4
[Pritchard 2012: 276]
More specifically, Pritchard’s thought is that as protoknowledge
evolves into knowledge in Craig’s story, the distinction between in-
formants with reliable cognitive abilities on the one hand and infor-
mants that we can rely on will open up [2012: 278]. It will not come
as a surprise that Pritchard’s ultimate aim is to use this distinction
to explain the existence and distinctness of the two master intuitions
4 There is an obvious problem with the thought that there could be an ambi-
guity in a notion. Ambiguity is the property of having more than one meaning.
Presumably, however, notions, like concepts, are individuated by meanings in such
a way that there cannot be ambiguous notions. Words (or phrases) can have more
than one meaning (viz. when they express more than one concept or notion) and
can thus be ambiguous. One way in which Pritchard may venture to circumvent
this problem is by distinguishing between the word ‘knowledge’ and the notion (or
concept) of knowledge. He may then assume that when the concept with the func-
tion of flagging good informants emerged, ‘knowledge’ was introduced to express
this concept. The concept expressed by ‘knowledge’ at this time is protoknowl-
edge, which subsequently evolves into knowledge so that ‘knowledge’ comes to
express knowledge. That said, for simplicity’s sake, I will allow myself to go along
with Pritchard’s talk of ambiguity and multiple senses of notions or concepts.
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about knowledge. In order to get there, Pritchard goes on to argue,
first, that the two senses of the notion are independent of one an-
other and, second, that the demands they impose correspond to the
demands of the two master intuitions.
In order to show that the two senses of the notion of reliable infor-
mant that give rise to them are independent of one another, Pritchard
adduces two cases:
Misleading Evidence. S is a reliable barn spotter but his audience or hearer,
H, has misleading evidence that S is in Fake Barn County (an envi-
ronment in which nearly all the structures that look like barns are
mere façades designed to fool unwitting agents like S) [2012: 277].5
Here, S is an informant who possesses a reliable cognitive ability but
not an informant H can rely on. The two senses of the notion of a
reliable informant can thus be dissociated.
Helpful Information. S is a normally unreliable predictor of the outcomes
of horse races, say, but H has additional evidence that the upcoming
race’s outcome will be fixed in accordance with S’s prediction [2012:
277].
Here, S is an informant H can rely on but not an informant with a
reliable cognitive ability. The two senses of the notion of a reliable
informant can thus be doubly dissociated.
Since the two senses of reliable informant are independent of one
another, they are fit to impose distinct demands on protoknowledge
at this stage of its evolution into knowledge. According to Pritchard,
they will do so, since there is every reason to expect that once the
distinction has opened up and it is clear that its two parts are suitably
independent, protoknowledge will henceforth respect both sides
of the distinction: neither agents we cannot rely upon nor agents
who have failed to fail to manifest a reliable cognitive ability will be
counted as knowers [2012: 278].
5 Recall that when Pritchard first introduces the notion of an informant that
one can rely on, he characterises an informant that one can rely on as an infor-
mant whose information will not lead one astray. However, given how Misleading
Evidence is intended to work, this characterisation cannot be what Pritchard really
has in mind. After all, S actually is a reliable barn spotter in a suitably friendly
environment (not Fake Barn County, etc.). As a result it is not as if the information
S provides will lead H astray. Rather, the problem is that, in view of the additional
information H possesses, H cannot trust S’s word. Accordingly, I will assume
that what Pritchard really means by ‘informant that one can rely on’ is ‘informant
whose word one can trust’.
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Even if we are prepared to follow Pritchard this far, we still have
to see that the two demands correspond to the demands of the two
master intuitions. In order to see how Pritchard argues that they do, it
will be necessary to take a closer look at the role Pritchard takes luck
to play in the cases that establish the independence of the two senses
of the notion of a reliable informant. In cases in which an agent
has a reliable cognitive ability but cannot be relied on (such as in
Misleading Evidence), good epistemic luck (S has the relevant ability6)
is cancelled out by bad epistemic luck (H has additional misleading
evidence) with the result that H cannot rely on S. At the same time,
in cases in which the agent can be relied on despite not having a
reliable cognitive ability (such as Helpful Information), bad epistemic
luck (S lacks the ability) is cancelled out by good epistemic luck (H
has additional helpful information) [2012: 277-8]. The thought here
seems to be that what explains why in these cases the two senses
of reliable informant come apart is that there are (different kinds of)
luck operative, which correspond to the kinds of luck at issue in the
two master intuitions [2012: 278].7
6 One might ask just why we should think that S’s having the relevant ability
counts as an instance of good epistemic luck. Unfortunately, Pritchard does not
offer much by way of an answer to this question. Part of the idea here appears to
be that it is lucky for H that S has the ability. However, on reflection, it is not really
clear why even this should be so (or why it should be relevant to whether S knows,
see §3.2). That prospective informants have mundane cognitive abilities, such as
the ability to spot barns, does not seem to be lucky for relevant inquirers. While
this aspect of Pritchard’s explanation thus remains somewhat puzzling, I will go
along with it for the time being.
7 For the record, here is how Pritchard himself states his answer to the crucial
question, after having introduced the distinction between the two senses of the
notion of a reliable informant, having argued their independence by means of Mis-
leading Evidence and Helpful Information, and having made the point about the role
of luck in these case:
With this . . . in mind, it ought to be clear why this ambiguity in the
idea of a reliable informant explains why the concept of knowledge
that evolves from the proto-concept will generate both the anti-luck
and the ability intuition. For as the range of cases which the concept
of knowledge is meant to apply to widens [i.e. as protoknowledge
evolves into knowledge], so the distinction will open up between
good informants who are reliable and good informants that we can
rely on, and we would expect the concept of knowledge that results
to respect both sides of this distinction. In particular, examples where
an agent possesses the relevant reliable cognitive abilities but where
the presence of epistemic luck means that we would not be able to
rely on this agent qua informant would not be counted as cases of
knowledge. Similarly, those cases in which an agent forms a true
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In a nutshell, then, Pritchard’s answer to the crucial question is
that, as protoknowledge evolves into knowledge, (i) a distinction
between two senses of the notion of a reliable informant opens up,
(ii) the two senses impose different demands on the concept of pro-
toknowledge (and hence on the concept of knowledge into which it
evolves), and (iii) that these demands correspond to the demands of
the two master intuitions about knowledge.
3 Problems with Pritchard’s explanation
3.1 Problem 1: Knowers who cannot be relied on
Let’s now ask how convincing Pritchard’s answer really is. Notice
that Pritchard’s story relies on the claim that the concept of knowl-
edge features a condition that rules against agents we cannot rely on.
(Recall that, according to Pritchard, “examples where an agent pos-
sesses the relevant reliable cognitive abilities but where the presence
of epistemic luck means that we would not be able to rely on this
agent qua informant would not be counted as cases of knowledge”
[2012: 278].) One problem for Pritchard is that the concept of knowl-
edge simply does not feature such a condition. Perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, Craig himself provides the relevant evidence for this:
[S]omeone who both knows the truth and is keen to reveal
it may be useless to others because he has no credibility
with them: the boy who cried ‘Wolf!’ so often that no-one
would believe him when the wolf really came is a caution-
ary example, as is Matilda of Hillaire Belloc’s Cautionary
Tales.
[Craig 1990: 17]
belief in an epistemically friendly environment—such that any true
belief so formed would not be subject to epistemic luck—would not
be counted as cases of knowledge so long as the agent concerned
failed to exhibit the relevant reliable cognitive abilities (even though
we could rely on this agent qua informant). In short, the concept of
knowledge that results will both (i) disallow cases of true belief as
knowledge where the belief isn’t appropriately due to the relevant
cognitive abilities on the part of the agent, and (ii) disallow cases of
true belief as knowledge where the truth of the belief is substantively
due to luck and hence unsafe.
[Pritchard 2012: 278]
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What Craig’s cases illustrate is that an agent can know a proposition
even though others cannot rely on that agent qua informant. The
boy knows that the wolf came and Belloc’s Matilda knows that the
house is on fire even though one not could rely on them because
they have a track record of making the corresponding false claims
that undermines their credibility.
One might be inclined to object on behalf of Pritchard that in
Craig’s cases it is not the “presence of epistemic luck” that prevents
us from being able to rely on the relevant agent qua informant. Re-
call that, in Pritchard’s Misleading Evidence, S has a reliable ability to
detect barns but cannot be relied on by H because H has mislead-
ing evidence that S is in Fake Barn County. Here, H’s misleading
evidence constitutes an element of bad epistemic luck that prevents
her from being able to rely on S. However, the same is not true in
Craig’s cases. There is no misleading evidence here. Hence, it might
be thought that, even though in Craig’s cases we cannot rely on the
agent qua informant, by Pritchard’s lights, this does not disqualify
him from being counted as knowing.
To see why this move fails, notice that we can easily amend the
cases in such a way that epistemic luck is involved in the same way
as in Pritchard’s own case: we just construe the case in such a way
that the hearers falsely believe on the basis of misleading evidence
that the agent has relevant track record. Even so, if the boy believes
that the wolf came because he has seen that he did and if Matilda
believes that the house is on fire because she has seen that it is, they
count as knowing what they have seen. Notice, furthermore, that the
same holds true in Pritchard’s Misleading Evidence in which H has
misleading evidence that S is in Fake Barn County: If S believes that
he is facing a barn, say, because he has seen that he is facing a barn,
he counts as knowing that he is facing a barn, no matter whether H
can rely on his word that he is facing a barn.
There is thus excellent reason to believe, pace Pritchard, that the
concept of knowledge does not feature a condition ruling against
agents we cannot rely on. As a result, Pritchard’s answer to the cru-
cial question remains unsatisfactory. There is after all little reason to
think that the sense of the notion of reliable informant according to
which a reliable informant is one that can be relied on had much of
a role to play in shaping the structure of the concept of knowledge.
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3.2 Problem 2: Hearer vs. speaker luck
Pritchard might venture to respond that while the concept of knowl-
edge we are familiar with today does not feature a condition ruling
against agents we cannot rely on, an ancestor of it did. At that point,
the anti-luck intuition came into existence. While the condition rul-
ing against agents we cannot rely on was subsequently filtered out
by objectivisation, the anti-luck intuition remained.
As a first observation, notice that on the present story the condi-
tion ruling against agents we cannot rely on makes a brief appear-
ance, leaves Pritchard exactly what he needs for his project, only to
then conveniently withdraw from the scene again. I would not be
surprised if there were many ears to which this sounds just too good
to be true.
Unfortunately, even this story won’t do the trick for Pritchard.
The reason for this is that there is a further problem concerning his
step from the condition ruling against agents we cannot rely on qua
informants to the thesis that this condition would give rise to the
anti-luck intuition. To begin with, Pritchard’s argument leaves a lot
implicit here. Pritchard offers a diagnosis of cases in which the agent
has a reliable cognitive ability but cannot be relied on in terms of luck.
For instance, in Misleading Evidence, what explains why H cannot rely
on S is that H suffers from bad epistemic luck—he has misleading
evidence. Presumably, the thought then is (a) that the relevant kind
of bad epistemic luck is incompatible with knowing and (b) that this
incompatibility generates the anti-luck intuition.
Concerning (a), we have already seen that there is excellent reason
to think that the relevant kind of epistemic luck is not incompatible
with knowing. In Craig’s cases as well as in Pritchard’s own Mis-
leading Evidence, the agents may know the relevant propositions even
though they cannot be relied on qua informants—for instance, if they
believe the propositions because they have seen that they are true. In
fact, a closer look at Pritchard’s diagnosis provides further support
for this point. What a careful look at the diagnosis makes clear is
that the person who is affected by luck here may be the hearer only.
To see this, consider once more Pritchard’s own case, Misleading Ev-
idence. Here it is only H who is suffering from epistemic bad luck.
H has the misfortune of having misleading evidence about S and as
a result cannot rely on S. As opposed to H, S is not suffering from
epistemic bad luck at all: S exercised a reliable cognitive ability in
favourable circumstances. It is hard to see, however, why H’s suf-
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fering from bad epistemic luck should undermine S’s knowing and
hence why the relevant kind of bad luck at issue here should be in-
compatible with S’s knowing.
Furthermore, contrary to (b), there is little reason to think that
a condition that disallows the kind of bad luck at issue here would
generate the anti-luck intuition. After all, as we have just seen, it
may well be that the only one affected by bad luck in the relevant
cases is the hearer. It is hard to see, however, why a condition that
rules against this kind of bad luck should generate an intuition ac-
cording to which lucky truth of the speaker’s belief is incompatible
with knowledge. Thus, even if we accepted that the condition ruling
against agents we cannot rely on entered and existed the story in just
the way Pritchard would need it to, there is still little hope that his
attempt at generating the anti-luck intuition would succeed.
3.3 Problem 3: The wrong hypothesis
A final worry about Pritchard argument arises from a challenge to
the very hypothesis he adopts from Craig. As I have argued in recent
work [Kelp 2011], Craig’s hypothesis is incorrect as there is a better
alternative in the offing. According to this alternative, the function
of the concept of knowledge consists in marking when an agent is
entitled to inquire no further into a given question. In order to bring
this point home, I offer a direct comparison of how the two hypothe-
ses fare given Craig’s own methodology. While I grant that both
hypotheses generate a concept that is very similar to the concept of
knowledge we are familiar with, I show that the alternative hypoth-
esis produces a better match. There are a couple of types of case
in which only the concept generated by the alternative hypothesis
passes the intuitively correct verdicts. In the first type of case, agents
have beliefs they won’t assert because they are bound by professional
secrecy. I argue that at least some such agents (such as priests under
the seal of confession) do not fall under the concept generated by
Craig’s hypothesis—they are not good informants even in the objec-
tive sense—while, intuitively, they know. In the other type of case,
the agents’ grounds for asserting differ from their grounds for be-
lieving. Crucially, the agent’s grounds for asserting are epistemically
unexceptionable, while the grounds for believing are epistemically
highly problematic. Here I show that the agents fall under the con-
cept generated by Craig’s hypothesis—they are good informants even
in the objective sense—while, intuitively, their ill-based beliefs don’t
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qualify as knowledge. As opposed to that, the concept generated by
the alternative hypothesis—the agents have an entitlement to inquire
no further—passes the right verdicts in both cases: priests under the
seal of confession have an entitlement to inquire no further into the
relevant questions concerning the sins of penitents, while agents who
base their beliefs on epistemically problematic grounds have no such
entitlement. Given that the alternative hypothesis produces a bet-
ter match with our contemporary concept of knowledge, Craig-style
epistemology confirms the alternative hypothesis whilst disconfirm-
ing Craig’s own contender.
The fact that the alternative hypothesis is preferable to Craig’s
need not pose a problem for Pritchard. It won’t if Pritchard can re-
cover his argument given the alternative hypothesis. Unfortunately
for Pritchard, the prospects for such recovery are rather dim. Af-
ter all, Pritchard’s crucial distinction between agents with a reliable
cognitive ability and agents we can rely on qua informants must not
be expected to have any relevance to a concept with the function of
marking when an agent is entitled to inquire no further into a given
question. In particular, I take it that no one would be tempted by the
idea that there is a sense of being entitled to inquire no further into a
given question according to which an agent possesses an entitlement
in this sense only if he can be relied on qua informant. That is to say,
once the problematic Craigian hypothesis is replaced by the alterna-
tive, already Pritchard’s first move loses any plausibility it may have
initially appeared to have had.
4 An alternative proposal
There is thus bad news for Pritchard: his answer to the crucial ques-
tion remains unsatisfactory. Fortunately, there is also good news. As
I am about to argue, a better answer can after all be given. This an-
swer improves on Pritchard’s own proposal in a number of respects.
First, it does not rely on there being a sense of reliable informant ac-
cording to which a reliable informant is one whom we can rely on
qua informant. Second, it does not presuppose an arguably incorrect
hypothesis about the function of the concept of knowledge but works
on the more plausible alternative. Third, unlike Pritchard’s answer, it
avoids the detour via the two master intuitions. Instead, the explana-
tion of why knowledge features both a safety and an ability condition
13
is direct.8
So how can the alternative hypothesis be used to answer the cru-
cial question? I will begin with the following observation about the
range of cases in which we would want a concept with this func-
tion to apply: we sometimes want to say that an agent is entitled
to inquire no further into some question when we ourselves do not
know the answer to it. This may happen in cases like the following:
Ernie is interested in the question whether the surface Bert is cur-
rently looking at is red but does not himself know the answer. In this
situation Ernie may want point out that Bert is entitled to inquire no
further into the matter. By the present hypothesis, knowledge will
allow him to achieve this. And so it does: Ernie can attribute to Bert
knowledge whether the surface is red.
In a similar way as Craig did, we can now ask ourselves what
sorts of conditions would govern a concept that serves this function
and is applicable when we ourselves don’t know the truth about the
question. For one, we would expect it to respect a modal condition:
Were we to find out that the attributee might so easily have been
mistaken, we could not attribute to him an entitlement to inquire no
further into the issue. Were Ernie to be informed that nearly all of
the surfaces in Bert’s environment that appear red are in fact non-
red, Ernie would have to withdraw his attribution of entitlement to
pursue the issue no further. What’s more, if Ernie knew that Bert’s
answer to the question of the colour of the surface is based only on
Bert’s taking appearances at face value, Ernie would have to deny
that Bert is entitled to pursue the question no further. Ernie would
have to say that Bert doesn’t know whether the surface is red.
At the same time, we would also expect a concept with the envis-
aged function to respect an ability condition: Were we to find out that
the attributee does not have the relevant cognitive ability, we could
not attribute to him an entitlement to inquire no further. Were Ernie
to be informed that Bert is red-green colour blind, Ernie would have
to withdraw his attribution of entitlement to pursue the issue no fur-
ther. What’s more, if Ernie knew that Bert’s answer to the question of
the colour of the surface is based only on exercising his ability to dis-
8 To see that this is an advantage, notice that Pritchard will need further as-
sumptions to get from the master intuitions to ALVE. In particular, he will need
his modal account of luck [Pritchard 2005: ch.5] (or something very close to it) to
get from the anti-luck intuition to ALVE’s safety condition. As a result, there is
yet another way in which he makes his argument vulnerable to failure: the modal
account of luck may prove to be wrong.
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cern colours, Ernie would have to deny that Bert is entitled to pursue
the question no further. Ernie would have to say that Bert doesn’t
know whether the surface is red.
It is not hard to see that these two conditions are independent of
one another. In the first case Ernie would have to withdraw his at-
tribution of knowledge/deny Bert knowledge even when Bert exer-
cises a highly reliable ability to tell colours apart. In the second case,
Ernie would have to withdraw his attribution of knowledge/deny
Bert knowledge even when the surface Bert is looking at could not
have been any colour other than red.
These considerations suggest that a concept with the function of
marking when an agent is entitled to inquire no further into some
question will feature both a safety and an ability condition. Given the
alternative hypothesis, according to which the concept of knowledge
is exactly this concept, we thus have an answer to the crucial ques-
tion. Furthermore, the present answer can be expected to avoid the
problems Pritchard encountered since, unlike Pritchard’s alternative,
it does not venture to generate the bipartite structure via a distinction
between the notion of an informant with a reliable cognitive ability
and the notion of an informant we can rely on.9 Rather, the bipar-
tite structure is generated by appeal to conditions that would force
a withdrawal of an attribution of the concept or replacement by de-
nial. These are exactly the kinds of consideration that would serve to
explain why the concept features the corresponding necessary con-
ditions. Thus, unlike Pritchard’s account, the present account does
offer the right kind of explanation of the bipartite structure of knowl-
edge.
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